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Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to explore the differences and similarities between Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s textualist approach to interpreting the Constitution and Justice Stephen Breyer’s 
Living Constitution approach (also called the evolutionist approach) by applying these disparate 
legal theories to Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association, a case currently 
pending before the Supreme Court whose resolution centers on the interpretation of the First 
Amendment. 
The textualist approach relies primarily on interpreting the original meaning of the text of 
the Constitution, and attempting to decide cases in a way that is faithful to an amendment’s 
words as written (Rossum et al. 4). The Living Constitution, or evolutionist approach to 
constitutional interpretation, contends that the meaning of the Constitution evolves with the 
standards of society, and the purpose or intent behind the Constitution or an amendment is as 
important, if not more so, than the literal language when interpreting a Constitutional amendment 
as it applies to actual cases as they arise (8). These two approaches are fundamentally 
oppositional, and Justices Scalia and Breyer are the very embodiment of these approaches on the 
Supreme Court today; each man avidly defends his respective approach in his opinions and other 
written works, and each exhibits the logic of these approaches in his decisions. 
In the following pages, this author will present the facts and history of Schwarzenegger v 
Entertainment Merchants Association, including the judicial history of the case within the lower 
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courts, followed by an exploration of the arguments presented by the Petitioners and the 
Respondents to the Supreme Court through their briefs. Next, the author will discuss and 
illustrate both Scalia’s and Breyer’s self-proclaimed defenses of their constitutional approaches, 
including Scalia’s scathing critique of the evolutionist or Living Constitution approach in his 
essay, “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts 
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,” as well as Justice Breyer’s book, Active Liberty, 
which is regarded as a direct response to Scalia’s essay. This section is intended to provide not 
only a working understanding of each Justice’s constitutional approach, but an in-depth 
examination of these approaches in these jurists’ own words, which is crucial to understanding 
the analysis that follows regarding this author’s reasoned opinion as to how they will 
individually decide Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association. 
The purpose of choosing a case that is undecided (at the time of this writing) is to explore 
and flesh out the actual decision-making process of both Justices and their constitutional 
theories, rather than merely critiquing their decisions and holdings in a case that has already been 
adjudicated.  This approach is arguably a more useful exercise than the latter, as it allows one to 
examine and weigh the justices’ motives, principles, and goals when deciding cases and provides 
insight into the active process these judges use to uphold constitutional rights. This exploration 
also allows one to decipher how these approaches are similar and different in interpreting the 
Constitution. In addition, the author has carefully chosen to examine Schwarzenegger v 
Entertainment Merchants Association for this purpose, as it is a highly useful example for 
exploring and applying these two theories of constitutional interpretation.
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Chapter I: 
Background and History of Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association
Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association presents the question of whether 
California’s Assembly Bill 1179 violates the First Amendment. The Act prohibits minors from 
purchasing video games that depict violence.  The Bill’s proponents assert that there is ample 
evidence from social scientists and published studies that demonstrate a direct causal link 
between violence in video games and violent behavior in minors (Brief for Petitioner at 1, 
Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Assoc., No. 08-1448 (July 12, 2010)).  Opponents contend 
that the Bill violates the First Amendment of the Constitution because it is overly vague, and 
constitutes a content-based restriction on speech that does not meet the criteria of the strict 
scrutiny test (Brief for Respondent at 16-18, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Assoc., No. 
08-1448 (July 22, 2010)). 
Assembly Bill No. 1179
     Assembly Bill 1179 was signed into law by Governor Schwarzenegger on October 7, 2005 
(AB 1179). It states that violent video games must be labeled as such (and more stringently than 
the current standards of the Entertainment Software Rating Board, or ESRB), and that minors 
under the age of 18 are prohibited from renting or buying such games. Additionally, the Bill 
dictates that any person who violates the Act by selling or renting a video game classified as 
violent by the Act is subject to a $1,000 fine per violation. (AB 1179). The Act does not prohibit 
a parent or guardian of a minor from buying or renting the labeled video games for his or her 
minor child to play.
     The Bill defines a video game as violent if “the range of options available to a player includes 
killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being” and these 
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actions meet a set of criteria (AB 1179).  The first set of criteria is that “[a] reasonable person, 
considering the game as a whole, would find [that it] appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of 
minors,” the video game “is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to 
what is suitable for minors,” and that the degree of video game violence “causes the game, as a 
whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors” (AB 1179). The 
second set of criteria under which a video game can be classified as offensively violent is if the 
game “[e]nables the player to virtually inflict serious injury upon images of human beings or 
characters with substantially human characteristics in a manner which is especially heinous, 
cruel, or depraved in that it involves torture or serious physical abuse to the victim” (AB 1179).
     In Section 1 of the bill, the California Legislature explains that the purpose of the act is to 
prevent offensively violent video games from causing harm to minors and to society. The Bill 
states that the “Legislature finds and declares” that “[e]xposing minors to depictions of violence 
in video games, including sexual and heinous violence, makes those minors more likely to 
experience feelings of aggression, to experience a reduction of activity in the frontal lobes of the 
brain, and to exhibit violent antisocial or aggressive behavior” (AB 1179). Additionally, the 
Legislature states that “[e]ven minors who do not commit acts of violence suffer psychological 
harm from prolonged exposure to violent video games,” and asserts that the “State has a 
compelling interest in preventing violent, aggressive, and antisocial behavior, and in preventing 
psychological or neurological harm to minors who play violent video games” (AB 1179).
     In the brief submitted by California to the Supreme Court, California asserts that the 
Legislature passed the Act because it “sought to reinforce the right of parents to restrict children's 
ability to purchase offensively violent video games” and that in so doing, it took into 
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consideration many reputable studies and reports “from social scientists and medical associations 
that establish a correlation between playing violent video games and an increase in aggressive 
thoughts and behavior, antisocial behavior, and desensitization to violence in both minors and 
adults” (Brief for Petitioner at 2, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Assoc., No. 08-1448 (July 
12, 2010)). California also cites in its brief the Legislature’s consideration of “the Federal Trade 
Commission's report that the video game industry specifically markets M-rated (Mature) video 
games to minors, that 69% of 13- to 16-year-old children were able to purchase M-rated games, 
and that only 24% of cashiers asked the minor's age” (Pet. Br. at 2).
First Amendment Challenge to Assembly Bill 1179
     Entertainment Merchants Association challenged Assembly Bill 1179 before its enforcement, 
arguing before the District Court that, “the Act violates the First Amendment and is 
unconstitutionally vague” (Brief for Respondent at 5, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Assoc., 
No. 08-1448 (July 22, 2010)). 
The First Amendment holds that “Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Const. amend. I).  While broad, the freedom of 
speech is not unlimited; there are certain categories of speech that do not fall under the protection 
of the First Amendment, or have a lower standard of protection when government regulations 
apply to them (Rossum et al. 187). These categories include obscenity, libel, and fighting words 
(187). However, the spheres of speech that are considered entitled to First Amendment protection 
have broadened substantially over the Supreme Court’s history (207). 
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In earlier cases, this protection derived from the English laws that the colonies inherited, 
and was applied primarily to the press and to political speech but did not include libel and other 
unprotected modes of speech (187-188). More recently, the Supreme Court has broadened its 
protection of libel and obscenity and has even extended it not only to the First Amendment 
protection of “freedom of speech” but of “freedom of expression,” which can take many forms 
(197). For example, in the 1989 case of Texas v Johnson, the court upheld the expressive right to 
burn the flag in protest of the government though the Constitution makes no mention of 
protecting expressive action (246). 
The broadening of First Amendment protection may be due to several factors, including 
the incorporation of the free speech and press guarantees to the states through the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (207). The Bill of Rights contained the first ten 
amendments to the Constitution that were applied to local governments, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1868 (52). Also, this broadening may be due to the Court gradually 
accepting various categories as deserving of protection which were previously unprotected, 
including “symbolic speech, commercial speech, and freedom of association” (Rossum 207). The 
expansion of First Amendment protections may also be attributable to the Court’s narrowing of 
its definitions of the categories of speech--“‘the lewd, and the obscene, the profane, the libelous, 
and the insulting or ‘fighting words’”--that are not entitled to First Amendment 
protection” (207). 
In examining whether a federal or state law violates the protections afforded by a 
fundamental right, such as those guaranteed under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
applied a stringent level of judicial review known as strict scrutiny (US Legal).  Strict scrutiny is 
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a 3-pronged test first espoused in the 1938 case of U.S. v Carolene Products (Carolene).  To pass 
this test of judicial scrutiny, a law that curtails a fundamental constitutional right must be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest; must be narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest; and must use the least restrictive means to achieve that interest (US Legal).  Often times, 
laws concerning the aforementioned unprotected categories of speech, such as those that attempt 
to outlaw forms of obscenity, are invalidated for over-breadth or vagueness under the strict 
scrutiny test (US Legal)(Brief for Respondent at 18, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Assoc., 
No. 08-1448 (July 22, 2010)). 
The increase in technological forms of expression, such as the Internet and video games, 
have had a significant impact on First Amendment jurisprudence, as these advances have forced 
the Supreme Court to apply old principles to new contexts (Rossum 206). As a result, the Court 
has had to face more and more cases similar to Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants 
Association because technological innovations and their increasing popularity in society have 
raised a host of issues concerning obscenity and the protection of minors under the First 
Amendment. Examples include Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, in which the Court 
“struck down provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 designed to regulate 
‘indecent’ material on the Internet,” and United States v. American Library Association which 
held that public libraries could not receive federal dollars if they did not take measures to prevent 
children from “obtaining access to material harmful to them” (Rossum 206). 
The crux of Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association is whether the case 
falls within the obscenity exception, a category of expression that is not protected by the First 
Amendment. Over the years, obscenity has been redefined in scope by the Court when 
 Moran 10
determining whether certain expression requires First Amendment protection. In Miller v 
California, the Court applied a three-pronged test for “identifying obscenity” (205). This test, 
which is almost identical in syntax and diction to the disputed Assembly Bill 1179 passed by 
California, states that something is obscene if “(a) ‘the average person, applying contemporary 
standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;...(b)...the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c)...the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value” (205) (Miller). 
In Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court upheld the use of the Miller Test, 
asserting that “government could only proscribe material that failed the three-part test for 
obscenity announced in Miller” (206).  In addition, the Court held in U.S. v Playboy 
Entertainment Group that regulations aimed at preventing children from seeing sexual material 
on cable TV were unconstitutional because the court was unwilling to risk creating restrictions 
on protected expression for adults when attempting to protect children. This ruling demonstrates 
how “the court’s position suggests the necessity of exploring non-censorial approaches to 
protecting children from inappropriate material” (206).
Procedural History of Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association
The District Court ruled in favor of Entertainment Merchants, holding that the Bill failed 
the strict scrutiny test because it did not employ the “least restrictive means of achieving the 
compelling interest in that the State did not demonstrate that parental controls available on some 
new versions of gaming consoles would be less effective” (Brief for Petitioner at 3, 
Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Assoc., No. 08-1448 (July 12, 2010)). Failing the scrutiny test 
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led the Court to permanently enjoin enforcement of the Act because it was unconstitutional on its 
face. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling, stating that 
it rejected California’s argument that the Act only applies to minors and to speech that is not 
protected under the First Amendment when minors are involved. California argued that video 
game violence should be considered obscene, and the State’s regulation of their sale is 
constitutionally similar to the regulation of sexual material to minors under Ginsberg v. New 
York; however, the court distinguished Ginsberg because it only applied to sexually obscene 
material and not to violence. The Court also employed the strict scrutiny test, and determined 
that California did not meet its criteria because of the reasons discussed in the District Court’s 
holding. The Court also asserted that California did not demonstrate a causal link between video 
game violence and psychological harm or increases in violent behavior in minors, but that even if 
it had, the Act was not the least restrictive means to mitigating the harm of violent video games 
(Pet. Br. at 3). California appealed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 
26, 2010, and heard oral argument on November 2, 2010.  The case is expected to be decided in 
June of 2011.
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Chapter II:
Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, California
Summary
California argues that it can constitutionally limit minors’ access to violent, harmful video 
games because such games which have “no redeeming value for children any different from 
sexually explicit material” and are thus unworthy of First Amendment protection (Brief for 
Petitioner at 3, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Assoc., No. 08-1448 (July 12, 2010)). The Act 
attempts to protect “to protect minors' physical and psychological welfare, as well as their ethical 
and moral development” by restricting their ability to access graphically violent and disturbing 
video games, and California asserts that it has a vital State’s interest in helping parents limit the 
amount of offensively violent material minors can have access to and thus consume. California 
asserts that allowing parents to have more of a role in controlling minors’ exposure to 
“offensively violent video games” does not obstruct the First Amendment rights of adults since 
the Act in question clearly does not apply to adults (Pet. Br. at 3). California also maintains that 
minors and adults should not be treated the same under the First Amendment, because minors 
have more restricted rights under the First Amendment due to the fact that they are less able than 
adults to make appropriate judgments on how much violent or sexually explicit material they 
should consume.
Appellant-Petitioner Brief
California frames the questions presented by the case to be, “[does] the First Amendment 
bar a state from restricting the sale of violent video games to minors?” and “if the First 
Amendment applies to violent video games that are sold to minors, and the standard of review is 
strict scrutiny, under Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, is the State required to 
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demonstrate a direct causal link between violent video games and physical and psychological 
harm to minors before the State can prohibit the sale of the games to minors?” (Pet. Br. at 1).
California asserts that its state legislature passed the Act in the hopes of “[reinforcing] the 
right of parents to restrict children's ability to purchase offensively violent video games” (Pet. Br. 
at 2). It was also motivated by the numerous reports and articles that indicate a correlation 
between graphically violent video games and aggression in minors. California cited the FTC 
report as to how much minors are able to purchase and view graphically violent video games. 
The Legislature also passed the Act because of particularly disturbing and sadistic scenes that 
players can engage in, using an example from a game known as Postal 2, which 
“involves shooting both armed opponents, such as police officers, and unarmed 
people, such as schoolgirls. Girls attacked with a shovel will beg for mercy; the 
player can be merciless and decapitate them. People shot in the leg will fall down 
and crawl; the player can then pour gasoline over them, set them on fire, and 
urinate on them. The player's character makes sardonic comments during 
all this; for example, urinating on someone elicits the comment "Now the 
flowers will grow” (Pet. Br. at 3). 
This kind of depiction of not only violence but pleasure in performing violent and 
depraved acts towards both adults and children, California asserts, is not worthy of First 
Amendment protection because it has no redeeming artistic value, and the standards of society 
would reasonably deem this as inappropriate material for minors to be exposed to (Pet. Br. at 3).
California argues that the First Amendment allows states to “restrict minors’ access to 
offensive and harmful violent video games absent parental supervision... [b]ecause the State has 
the vital interest in reinforcing parents' authority to direct the upbringing of children in order to 
protect their physical and psychological welfare, as well as their ethical and moral development, 
restrictions on minors' access to offensively violent material are constitutionally 
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permissible.” (Pet. Br. at 3). California asserts that minors do not have the same First 
Amendment rights that adults have, because “[t]his precious right presupposes the capacity of the 
individual  to make a reasoned choice as to whether to consume specific speech...[and] [m]inors 
lack such capacity” (Pet. Br. at 6). 
California concedes that even though any laws that restrict speech are considered void 
under the First Amendment, and it is the burden of the State to prove that a law does not violate 
the Constitution, the context of the Act “is all important” (Pet. Br. at 5).  California points out 
that the Supreme Court case history demonstrates that “the Court...has allowed the government 
to regulate the content of offensive speech that could harm children, even though the speech 
would have been fully protected in other contexts” (Pet. Br. at 5). Petitioners reinforce this point 
by asserting that there has been in the “[Supreme] Court's precedent: (1) a recognition that 
parents must have substantial freedom to direct the upbringing of their children; and (2) a 
recognition that minors' rights may be curtailed in ways that the rights of adults cannot” (Pet. Br. 
at 5). Consistent with these principles, this Court has recognized that the First Amendment rights 
of minors are not "co-extensive with those of adults" in cases such as Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.  
California asserts that the State must protect minors’ liberty by reinforcing the parents’ 
ability to make beneficial choices about how their children develop despite potentially harmful 
influences. Combining this intention of the State and minors’ special standing under the First 
Amendment, “laws that prohibit the sale to minors of violent material that is patently offensive, 
appeals to a minor's deviant or morbid interest, and lacks serious socially redeeming value for 
minors should properly be reviewed under the standard set forth by this Court in Ginsberg v. New 
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York” (Pet. Br. at 5). If examined through the lens of this Ginsberg standard, it “should make no 
constitutional difference whether the material depicts sex or violence,” and “the Act must be 
upheld so long as it was not irrational for the California legislature to determine that exposure to 
the material regulated by the statute is harmful to minors” (Pet. Br. at 9). 
Applying the Ginsberg standard rather than strict scrutiny would allow the State to pass 
laws that boost the parents’ ability to protect minors’ wellbeing.  Doing so, Petitioners claim, 
would “balance the rights of minors with the State’s interest in reinforcing parents’ prerogative to 
direct the upbringing of their children,” respects the parents’ control over which materials their 
children are exposed to, and aids parents in protecting their children from expression that “is just 
as harmful, if not more so, as sexual material” (Pet. Br. at 9). California asserts that the Ginsberg 
“case is premised upon society's traditional interest in protecting children from harm and helping 
parents direct their children's moral and social development” (Pet. Br. at 5). Additionally, 
petitioners assert that “[v]iolent video games, like sexual images, can be harmful to minors and 
have little or no redeeming social value for them” (Pet. Br. at 4-5). 
California further argues that “this Court has consistently recognized that parents must be 
permitted, with governmental assistance, to help shape that marketplace for minors given their 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility and vulnerability to negative influences...[and] the 
Ginsberg standard properly accounts for fundamental differences in the inherent vulnerabilities 
and susceptibilities to negative influences between adults and minors”(Pet. Br. at 9).  In 
consideration of these state purposes, the strict scrutiny standard does not make the proper 
distinction between adult and adolescent vulnerability to speech, and is contradictory to the 
Constitution, since the “First Amendment has never been understood as guaranteeing minors 
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unfettered access to offensively violent material”(Pet. Br. at 5). California points to the fact that 
“[a]lthough the New York law at issue in Ginsberg would not have survived judicial scrutiny had 
it applied to adults, this Court upheld the law because it targeted purchases only by minors” (Pet. 
Br. at 5-6). California argues that the First Amendment rights of minors cannot be equal to those 
of adults because of “undeniable distinctions between adults and minors” (Pet. Br. at 9). 
Petitioners claim that since “the parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to 
mature through late adolescence, speech may have a deeper and more lasting negative effect on a 
minor than on an adult” and that examining the Act under strict scrutiny would ignore these 
developmental differences that are crucial to determining the perniciousness of certain speech 
directed at minors (Pet. Br. at 5).
Petitioners further argue that the offensively violent material of these games “shares the 
same characteristics as other forms of unprotected speech, especially sexually explicit material” 
and that, historically, states have regulated the selling of sexual and violent material to underage 
citizens (Pet. Br. at 9). California argues that these laws originate in “society's understanding that 
violent material can be just as harmful to the well-being of minors as sexually explicit 
material” (Pet. Br. at 9). It is therefore illogical to treat violence and sexuality as so different 
when determining the harm that such expression may have on minors, so that states can legislate 
against one but not the other. California asserts that this makes an unnecessary and false 
distinction, since both could be harmful to adolescent development. 
Moreover, Petitioners assert that the Legislature incorporated the Miller Test into the Act 
so that this new prohibition would only apply to a narrow category of speech. In their reply brief, 
Petitioners argue that the Act that Respondents criticize as a dangerous expansion of 
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governmental power to censor expression] has “nothing in common with the statute at issue in 
this case” (Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Assoc., No. 
08-1448 (October 8, 2010)). California’s restriction only applies to video games which meet the 
very specific criteria laid out by the Act in detail, and will not create a chilling effect on speech 
because the guidelines for rating a game as too offensively violent for children to view are clear 
and precise. 
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Chapter III
Brief of Appellee-Respondent, Entertainment Merchants Association
Summary
     In their briefs submitted for consideration to the Supreme Court, Entertainment Merchants 
argue against this new California legislation within the framework of landmark cases that 
dictated the Supreme Court’s First Amendment Doctrine. The main argument put forth is that 
video games are worthy of First Amendment protection, and that a minors’ rights under the First 
Amendment are equal to an adult’s except in very narrowly defined circumstances, none of 
which apply to the Act at issue. Merchants also assert that content-based restrictions on speech 
require the court to use strict scrutiny in deciding the case, and that California’s Act fails the 
strict scrutiny test. In applying this test, Merchants argues that California did not use the least 
restrictive means possible to achieve the Act’s goals, especially since statistics show that the 
current video game rating system has been effective in both informing parents about ratings and 
preventing minors from buying violent video games without parental consent. Additionally, 
Merchants conclude that California’s assertion that the Court should employ the rational 
balancing test instead of strict scrutiny, that violence should be considered to be in the same 
unprotected category as sexual obscenity, and that violent video games should be placed in a new 
unprotected category under the First Amendment is both dangerous and meritless.
Appellee-Respondent Brief:
In the Appellee-Respondent brief submitted to the Court, the Entertainment Merchants 
Association (“Merchants”) assert that “video games are a modern form of artistic expression” 
that is creative in nature, and as worthy of protection under the First Amendment as literature, 
cinema, music, and other protected art forms and expressive media (Brief for Respondent at 2, 
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Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Assoc., No. 08-1448 (July 22, 2010)). Similar to film and 
literature, video games contain “dialogue, music, visual images, plot, and character 
development,” as well as “classic themes that have captivated audiences for centuries, such as 
good-versus-evil, triumph over adversity, struggle against corrupt powers, and quest for 
adventure” (Resp. Br. at 6). 
The interactive element of video games, in which the players control characters’ 
interactions and the plot, the Respondents argue, does not minimize video games’ entitlement to 
full protection under the First Amendment; “if anything, the interactive aspect of video games 
heightens the First Amendment values at stake, because playing a game involves expressive 
activity not only by the game creators but by the player as well” (Resp. Br. at 7). This ability to 
control video games is thus tantamount to composing a musical score or reading literature. 
Merchants quote Judge Posner in American Amusement Machine Ass’n v Kendrick, who 
“explained, "[a]ll literature . . . is interactive[...] [l]iterature when it is successful draws the reader 
into the story, makes him identify with the characters, invites him to judge them and quarrel with 
them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the reader's own" (Resp. Br. at 7). Respondents 
argue that “California fundamentally distorts bedrock First Amendment principles when it 
suggests that video games are entitled to lesser protection because their interactivity increases 
the impact of their expression on the viewer” (Resp. Br. at 7). 
In response to California’s argument that depictions of violence in video games are not 
protected, Merchants assert that “[d]epictions of violence in video games -- like all other media 
-- are fully protected by the First Amendment” (Resp. Br. at 7). Respondents reference the case 
of U.S. v Stevens, using it as an example to demonstrate the limits of the Court’s First 
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Amendment Doctrine. In Stevens, the Court held that only a few categories of expression are 
considered unprotected by the First Amendment: obscenity, incitement, and defamation. 
Respondents also assert that in R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, the Court held that "'From 1791 to the 
present' . . . the First Amendment has 'permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few 
limited areas,' and has never 'include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional 
limitations’" (Resp. Br. at 7). As these Court decisions demonstrate, the Respondents argue, 
“depictions of violence have never been considered a category of unprotected expression” (Resp. 
Br. at 7). 
Although California argues that it can protect minors from “offensive” expression 
whether it is violent or not, Respondents maintain that the State has no “free floating power” to 
censor what minors view (Resp. Br. at 9). Minors’ rights under the First Amendment are equal to 
the rights adults enjoy, except in narrow circumstances that, in the Respondents’ view, are not 
exhibited by the facts of this case. Additionally, the brief states that California’s argument that 
the State can interfere because it desires to aid parents in choosing suitable material for their 
children is not defendable because “[t]hat justification could justify a ban on virtually anything” 
and snowball out of control (Resp. Br. at 9). Although parents have the right to decide what their 
children are exposed to, “that parental prerogative does not give the government the right to 
decide what is worthy for minors to view,” and parents, not politicians, should retain this power 
(Resp. Br. at 12). 
       Respondents reject California’s attempt to use the landmark case of Ginsberg v New York to 
justify censoring violence when minors are concerned. Respondents point out that Ginsberg does 
not include violence in its holding that minors can be censored from obscenity, since “[t]his court 
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has unanimously held that obscenity is limited to ‘works which depict or describe sexual 
conduct’” (Resp. Br. at 7). Ginsberg therefore does not allow the State to equate violence with 
sexual obscenity when restricting minors’ First Amendment rights. Additionally, the Respondents 
argue, Ginsberg’s holding only applies to sexual obscenity because sex, as opposed to graphic 
violence, does not play the same “celebrated” role in American cultural expression and tradition 
(since gruesome violence is in everything from Greek myths to the Harry Potter books). 
Ginsberg also “expressly disclaimed any holding beyond obscenity,” stating that there was “no 
occasion in this case to consider the impact of the guarantees of freedom of expression upon the 
totality of the relationship of the minor and the State” (Resp. Br. at 11). Respondents also assert 
that “California’s attempt to equate portrayals of violence with sexual materials ignores an 
important reality: violence, unlike explicit descriptions of sex, is a central feature of expression 
intended for minors,” as is demonstrated in works such as Lord of the Flies, the Harry Potter 
books, Lord of the Rings, and Grimm’s Fairy Tales (Resp. Br. at 11).
Merchants portray as potentially dangerous California’s arguments “that some expression 
to minors, even if entirely non-sexual in content, is unprotected by the First Amendment” and 
that the Legislature “can [therefore] ban speech to minors that it deems potentially 
harmful” (Resp. Br. at 8). Respondents assert that “it is critical to recognize the radical nature of 
California’s position [since] California asserts the power to decide that certain otherwise-
protected, non-sexual content is so offensive that it is ‘simply not worthy of constitutional 
protection’ as to minors” (Resp. Br. at 8). Respondents deem this logic unacceptable. Quoting 
U.S. v Playboy Entertainment Group, Merchants argue that “content based restrictions are 
presumptively unconstitutional precisely because ‘opinions and judgments, including esthetic 
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and moral judgments...are...not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval 
of a majority’” (Resp. Br. at 8). 
Additionally, Respondents insist that this is a dangerous Constitutional position for the 
government that could have far-reaching consequences if validated by the Court, since “this 
argument has almost no stopping point because so many expressive works contain violent 
depiction or other content that someone could deem offensive for minors...[and][a]ccepting 
California’s position would thus justify censorship of a wide range of expressive materials by 
states and localities around the country, a result anathema to the First Amendment” (Resp. Br. at 
8-9). Respondents also warn that California’s assertion that it will only regulate offensive 
expression “only compounds the First Amendment problem” because it “invites viewpoint 
discrimination,” which was considered unconstitutional by the Court in R.A.V. v City of St. Paul 
(Resp. Br. at 9). Respondents also conclude that the vagueness of the Act, its overbreadth, and its 
harsh penalties will have a chilling effect on speech that is constitutionally unacceptable.
Respondents use Supreme Court precedent to demonstrate that minors’ rights under the 
First Amendment are equal to adult’s, except for a few narrow circumstances which they argue 
are not present in the facts of this case. McConnell v. FEC held that the “general rule is that ‘[m]
inors enjoy the protection of the First Amendment,” and Tinker v. Des Moines established that 
minors “‘are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect’ and they ‘may not be 
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to 
communicate’” (Resp. Br. at 9). Respondents assert that minors are “participants in the 
marketplace of ideas” that cannot fully develop, become independent, or be “responsible 
citizens” if forced to live in an “intellectual bubble” dictated by the State (Resp. Br. at 9). The 
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Court has repeatedly refuted arguments such as California’s that minors need to be protected 
from certain forms of speech, asserting that “[w]e have held consistently that speech ‘cannot be 
suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks 
unsuitable for them’” in cases such as Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville (Resp. Br. at 9). 
The Respondents’ brief also discusses California’s contention that the Court should use 
rational-basis scrutiny because the Act is only meant “to assist parents” through labeling games 
that meet the State’s new definition of violence (Resp. Br. at 10). Respondents point out that 
when it comes to other expressive mediums, such as the radio, television, and internet, “the 
Court has not freely allowed the government to censor speech it deems inappropriate for minors, 
instead relying on parents to control access in the first instance” (Resp. Br. at 9). Respondents 
assert that it is “undisputed” that parents have control over what speech or expression their 
children are exposed to, but that this does not allow the government to decide what kinds of 
expression are “‘worthy’ of protection” because the “First Amendment leaves ‘these 
judgments...for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree,’” as the Court stated in 
Playboy (Resp. Br. at 10). 
Respondents reject California’s assertion that violent video games should be placed in a 
new category in which the First Amendment applies to minors’ exposure to violence in video 
games differently than to other mediums. Respondents maintain that there is no evidence that the 
depictions of violence in video games warrant a new First Amendment exception, since parents 
do not seem to have a problem monitoring their children’s video game exposure or intake, and 
the Act’s referenced social science does not sufficiently demonstrate psychological harm or an 
increase in violence among minors from playing video games.   
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California’s “emphasis on assisting parents, while allowing them to make final choices 
about the games their children will play, means that the State has no regulatory interest unless 
parents are in fact experiencing difficulty monitoring their children and making those 
choices”(Resp. Br. at 12).  The statistical evidence provided by the Respondents, however, 
demonstrates that parents do not need this assistance, and the State is therefore interfering in 
citizens’ choices unnecessarily.  There is also little evidence of children disobeying their parents 
in playing violent video games, since many are financially dependent, and need their parents to 
buy the game from the store or online in order to play. Additionally, the technological controls 
parents have over consoles prevents minors from playing video games in their absence of a 
certain rating. These opportunities for parental supervision and the evidence that parents already 
sufficiently monitor their children’s intake of violent video games are ignored in California’s 
insistence that parents need the State’s aid.  
Respondents also undermine California’s evidence that video games inflict “any real 
harm” on minors’ development or behavior, pointing to the fact that “the research cited by 
California has been resoundingly rejected by every court to have looked at it” because “it does 
not show that video games cause actual harm to minors, and it purports to find the same 
measured effects for a wide array of stimuli, including games designed for small children, 
television cartoons, or even a picture of a gun” (Resp. Br. at 12). Respondents comment that if 
these sorts of inconclusive social studies could justify making expression unprotected, “the First 
Amendment would mean very little” (Resp. Br. at 12). 
     California also attempts to avoid the “violence-prevention rationale” though the Act asserts 
that it is attempting to prevent violence, most likely because California is aware that video games 
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cannot count as incitement (discussed in Brandenburg holding). California focuses on a “more 
amorphous harm -- causing increased ‘aggressive thoughts and behavior’ in minors” (Resp. Br. at 
12). However, research by Dr. Craig Anderson, which California primarily relies on in its 
arguments, has drawbacks discussed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision. The Ninth 
Circuit asserted that these studies are fundamentally inconclusive and flawed since most of the 
studies do not aim to prove that there is a causal relationship between video games and 
aggression in minors but aim to “establish a correlation between preference for violent games 
and aggressive personal behavior -- though many other studies have not” (Resp. Br. at 12), 
Respondents also point out that the studies themselves admit that there is no way to determine 
“‘which way the causal relationship runs: it may be that aggressive children may also be 
attracted to violent video games’” (Resp. Br. at 12). In the experimental studies California cites, 
the “effect sizes” Dr. Anderson calculates through a series of psychological tests for video games 
“are essentially the same” as the effect sizes he calculated for television (Resp. Br. at 12). Dr 
Anderson “also admitted that the increases in ‘aggression’ he purported to measure would result 
from a ‘very large number’ of stimuli other than video games” (Resp. Br. at 12). Respondents 
assert that the value of California’s evidence that video games cause aggression and 
psychological harm to children is largely unpersuasive and minimized even by those who 
conducted the experiment. 
Respondents point to a long history of legislative assaults on new mediums of expression, 
and say that every new medium faced a similar reaction from the government to restrict it. 
However, each attempt was unwarranted, and the Court has always upheld the First Amendment. 
This is especially apparent in initial legislative reactions against true crime novels, movies, and 
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the Internet, which the court deemed protected under the Free Speech Clause and liable to strict 
scrutiny, despite “purported social science support” (Resp. Br. at 15). Respondents argue that the 
Court should similarly refuse to take the “‘starch’ out of strict scrutiny review” in this attack on a 
new mode of expression as well (Resp. Br. at 15).  Respondents conclude that a new exception 
would be both unwarranted and dangerous, putting too much power in the hands of the 
Legislature to disregard rights of expression as long as it uses the justification that it is protecting 
the wellbeing of minors. 
Respondents, after disputing the argument that a new exception is necessary by showing 
that evidence that video games are causing harm or inciting violence in youth is tenuous, 
demonstrate that not only should strict scrutiny be used, but that California’s Act fails strict 
scrutiny review for several reasons. Respondents claim that the Act first fails strict scrutiny 
because it does not advance a compelling interest of the State. Although the State has a 
compelling interest to protect minors, “California does not have a compelling interest in 
shielding minors from constitutionally protected expression that it deems offensive” (Resp. Br. at 
16). Respondents maintain that, “to the extent that California seeks to regulate conduct resulting 
from expression, it must show that the regulation satisfies the Brandenburg standard [(incitement 
limited to expression both intended and likely to cause imminent lawlessness)], which it plainly 
does not” (Resp. Br. at 16). The assertion that there is a compelling interest to reduce 
psychological harm to minors is also not credible because it is based on weak social science 
studies and other evidence. Although California stated that the Ninth Circuit wrongly used a 
“‘heightened standard of proof requirement,’” the Circuit Court merely used the usual strict 
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scrutiny standard of review, and California failed to demonstrate that there was an “actual harm” 
or problem that the Act needed to address as a compelling interest of the State (Resp. Br. at 16). 
     After failing to provide strong evidence of harm, California attempted to convince the Court 
to engage in a “deferential approach to ‘legislators' predictive judgments of harm," essentially 
allowing the Legislature to review a diverse array of social science studies and decide which 
ones to credit’” (Resp. Br. at 17). Respondents cite Playboy, which held that “‘[d]eference to a 
legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at 
stake’” (Resp. Br. at 17). Respondents further add that the Act also fails the “material 
advancement prong” because “violent video games represent only ‘a tiny fraction of the media 
violence to which modern American children are exposed,’” and there are numerous other forms 
of media which minors can access that similarly depict graphic scenes of violence. To reinforce 
this point, respondents observe that California’s “own evidence, taken at face value, indicates that  
the effect of exposure to violent video games is the same as exposure to other media containing 
violence” (Resp. Br. at 17).
       Respondents also attempt to prove that the Act fails strict scrutiny review because “it 
threatens to censor a wide range of fully protected expression,” and is therefore not narrowly 
tailored. Respondents assert that the Act is so broad in its language that “it would reach a huge 
range of expression that has never been thought inappropriate for minors” (Resp. Br. at 17-18). 
The “overbreadth” of the Act is in itself a demonstration that the Act is not narrowly tailored 
(Resp. Br. at 18). Respondents elaborate on this last statement by highlighting how California’s 
system makes no distinction between a 17 year-old and a child in elementary school, though the 
industry’s rating system is not so all encompassing in its rating of video games. If 17 year-olds 
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are weeks away from being able to enlist in the military, Respondents assert, it is illogical and 
overly broad in law to encompass them in the same category as young children when it comes to 
viewing depictions of violence.  
Respondents further demonstrate that California’s bill fails strict scrutiny review because 
the State did not use the least restrictive means possible to achieve its purported goals. California 
did not demonstrate that the current rating system (under the Entertainment Software Rating 
Board, or ESRB) is ineffective in preventing minors from purchasing and playing violent video 
games without parental permission, and fails to acknowledge the power parents have over their 
children’s exposure to violent video games with parental controls in video game systems. 
Respondents assert that the new rating will cause confusion about an already uniform, voluntary, 
and broadly used system by parents. Vendors may fear the penalties of the Act so much that they 
refuse to carry certain games for fear that an employee may accidentally sell it to a minor and 
thus trigger liability. This could unintentionally thereby limit adults’ access to video game 
expression as well, “further limiting the range of expression for adults” (Resp. Br. at 18). 
Supplanting the current system or current controls, or engaging in more education outreach to 
parents would have been examples of least-restrictive attempts to promote preventing minors 
from viewing video games that contain violence their parents consider unacceptable. According 
to the Respondents, California, therefore, fails each of the three prongs necessary to pass the 
strict scrutiny test deemed applicable to legislation that restricts speech based on content by the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment Doctrine. 
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Chapter IV: 
Scalia’s Textual Approach to Interpretation
Justice Scalia’s decision-making process could be summed up in two words: text and 
tradition. Scalia is wary of any departure from the original meaning of the Constitution’s text, 
strongly criticizing Supreme Court decisions that he believes demonstrate an activist judiciary 
rather than a neutral decision-making branch of a democracy. Scalia “argues that primacy must 
be accorded to the text, structure, and history of the document being interpreted and that the job 
of the judge is to apply either the clear textual language of the Constitution or statute...[i]f the 
text is ambiguous, yielding several conflicting interpretations, Scalia turns to the specific legal 
tradition flowing from that text—‘to what it meant to the society that adopted it’” (Rossum 27). 
In the case of Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association, as discussed 
below, Justice Scalia will most likely find that California’s law to censor “patently offensive” 
video games for minors is unconstitutional, and reject California’s assertion that the court should 
use a new Ginsberg standard rather than the strict scrutiny standard when evaluating the Bill in 
dispute, because his textualist approach would be highly inhospitable to California’s arguments 
(Brief for Petitioner at 3, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Assoc., No. 08-1448 (July 12, 
2010)). The attempt to create new, untraditional standards to evaluate a government’s ability to 
censor speech and to convey the text of the amendment as able to include a new unprotected 
category that was not conveyed or included in the original meaning, as the authors understood it, 
is inconsistent with Scalia’s textualist ideology. 
Justice Scalia famously defends the textualist approach to interpreting the Constitution in 
his essay, “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws.” He asserts that textualism is a more traditional 
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and true way to represent the Constitution in Supreme Court decisions, primarily because the 
Constitution is not meant to change with the times, but to instill long-standing values in the law. 
His essay evaluates how the common law tradition should not be applied to the Constitution 
because the Constitution is supposed to be stable in meaning over time. Allowing judges to 
dictate the law and the direction of its development is a necessary aspect of common law, he 
argues, but should not drive the interpretive framework of Justices. He argues that, “attacking the 
enterprise [of constitutional interpretation] with the Mr. Fix-it mentality of the common-law 
judge is a sure recipe for incompetence and usurpation” (Scalia 14). This common-law approach, 
according to Justice Scalia, is inherent in the Living Constitution approach to interpretation, and 
makes it inherently flawed as a guide for Supreme Court Justices to decide cases. He believes 
that “reliance on text and tradition is a means of constraining judicial discretion....[and] faithful 
adherence to the text of a constitutional... provision...or, if that is ambiguous, to the traditional 
understanding of those who originally adopted it reduces the danger that judges will substitute 
their beliefs for society’s” (Rossum 27). 
He states that he does not intend to change how the development of the common law is 
driven by the judge who decides common law cases, primarily because it is a good method of 
refining the law in many fields, but also because “an argument can be made that development of 
the bulk of private law by judges (a natural aristocracy, as Madison accurately portrayed them) is 
a desirable limitation upon popular democracy” (Scalia 12). However, he quantifies this dubious 
approval of the common law process, proclaiming that “though [he has] no quarrel with the 
common law and its process, [he does] question whether the attitude of the common-law judge--
the mind-set that asks, “[w]hat is the most desirable resolution of this case, and how can any 
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impediments to the achievement of that result be evaded?”--is appropriate for most of the work 
that [he does], and much of the work that state judges do” (13).  He jabs at other interpretive 
approaches to the Constitution, asserting that the Constitution is not a document that “is in effect 
a charter for judges to develop an evolving common law of freedom of speech, of privacy rights, 
and the like [because this] frustrates the whole purpose of a written constitution” (13). 
Scalia defends his interpretive theory against critics’ accusations, asserting that 
“in some sophisticated circles, it is considered simpleminded-- ‘wooden,’ 
‘unimaginative,’ ‘pedestrian’. It is none of that. To be a textualist in good standing, one 
need not be too dull to perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is designed, or 
could be designed, to serve; or too hide-bound to realize that new times require new laws. 
One need only  hold the belief that judges have no authority  to pursue those broader 
purposes or write those new laws” (23). 
He argues that “textualism should not be confused with so-called strict constructionism, a 
degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute” (23). However, 
though he makes sure to assert that no one ought to be a strict constructionist, he asserts that 
even that less cohesive form of interpretation is better than non-textualism. 
Scalia maintains that within his judicial philosophy of textualism, “a text should not be 
construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to 
contain all that it fairly means” (23). He also purports to refute criticism of textualism, stating 
that “while the good textualist is not a literalist, neither is he a nihilist. Words do have a limited 
range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes beyond that range is permissible” (24). He 
argues that “of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is that it is 
formalistic...the rule of law is about form,” proclaiming, “long live formalism...it is what makes a 
government a government of laws and not of men” (25).
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In his defense of textualism, he discusses the “widely criticized” canons of interpretation 
(25). He references both the canon noscitur a sociis, which translates into “it is known by its 
companions” and “stands for the principle that a word is given meaning by those around it,” and 
the canon ejusdem generis, which literally means “of the same sort” (26). Scalia argues that 
attacks on these canons are illogical because “all of this is so commonsensical that, were the 
canons not couched in Latin, you would find it hard to believe anyone could criticize them” (26). 
He defends the canons as legitimate tools of interpretation despite “being attacked as a sham,” 
arguing that “every canon is simply one indication of meaning; and if there are more contrary 
indications (perhaps supported by other canons), [this indication of meaning] must yield” (26). 
However, even if the process of using canons while interpreting the meaning of a text is not 
always perfect, “that does not render the entire enterprise a fraud--not at least unless the judge 
wishes to make it so” (27). He also responds to the preconceived notion of textualism that the 
founder’s opinions were authoritative, asserting “[w]hat I look for in the Constitution is exactly 
what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen 
intended” (38).
     Scalia argues that the “the distinctive problem of constitutional interpretation” is not due to 
the nature of the Constitution as a text, but the way in which the judicial system approaches its 
interpretation (37). He jabs that “the problem is distinctive, not because special principles of 
interpretation apply, but because the usual principles are being applied to an unusual text”(37). 
The common law methods of interpreting law, he asserts, are inappropriate in the constitutional 
realm. 
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In demonstrating why he believes other constitutional approaches are incorrect, Scalia 
states that “in textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution 
tells us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than 
narrow interpretation--though not an interpretation that the language will not bear” (37). Scalia 
uses free speech as one such inappropriate expansion of constitutional text. He asserts that, “the 
provision of the First Amendment that forbids abridgment of ‘the freedom of speech, or of the 
press’...does not list the full range of communicative expression” (37). He elaborates by stating 
how a handwritten letter, for example, cannot be censored by extension of this, though not all 
expression is covered by the umbrella of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. He argues 
that, “in this constitutional context, speech and press, the two most common forms of 
communication, stand as a sort of synecdoche for the whole [and] that is not strict construction, 
but it is reasonable construction” (38). 
Scalia states that he is against examining the intent of the Founders as a guide for 
decision making and criticizes other justices for evaluating the intent of legislators when 
examining a statute’s text. He concedes that although he references the writings of some of those 
“who happened to be delegates to the Constitutional Convention,” he does so to construe the 
meaning of the text of the Constitution properly rather than to discern the intent of the 
Constitution’s writers (38). He asserts that their writings are important to examine from the 
textualist perspective because they “display how the text of the Constitution was originally 
understood” (38). He attempts to sift out the “original meaning of the text, not what the original 
draftsmen intended,” because the textualist tradition depends on the meaning of the text at the 
time it was drafted rather than what the words are perceived to mean in present society (38). 
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Scalia describes the dilemma of textualism in relation to this search for the text’s meaning 
at the time of its drafting, elaborating that “the great divide with regard to constitutional 
interpretation is not that between the Framers’ intent and objective meaning, but rather that 
between original meaning (whether derived from the framers intent or not) and current 
meaning” (38). This distinction is crucial for comparing the constitutional approaches of Breyer 
and Scalia in deciding cases that come before the Supreme Court.
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Chapter V: 
Breyer’s Active Liberty and Living Constitution Approach
Stephen Breyer promotes a highly specialized Constitutional philosophy known as the 
living constitution or evolutionist approach. In his book Active Liberty, he illustrates this 
approach to constitutional interpretation, which focuses primarily on making America’s 
experiment in democracy functional by giving a voice to the people through the collective 
opinions and judgments of the nine unelected Justices of the Supreme Court. The notion of 
“active liberty” allows not only a democratic boost of power to American citizens by giving their 
convictions influence over judges’ interpretation of the Constitution, but also focuses practically 
on the consequences that rulings have for the American people and their ability to engage in 
democratic self-governance. 
Breyer defends The Living Constitution approach and adds a new theoretical framework 
to propel the evolution of Constitutional interpretation. His “thesis is that courts should take 
greater account of the Constitution’s democratic nature when they interpret 
Constitutional...texts” (Breyer 5). Breyer attempts to “illustrate [how] a democratic theme
—‘active liberty’...resonates throughout the Constitution” and how a democratically-minded 
approach when interpreting “a legal text will yield better law--law that helps a community of 
individuals democratically find practical solutions to important contemporary problems” (5)(6). 
He asserts that active liberty is an “important theme” of the Living Constitution approach 
which should encourage judges to interpret legal and constitutional text in a way that improves 
the functioning of democracy in American society (7). He additionally suggests that the current 
Court is “too often underemphasizing or overlooking the contemporary importance of active 
liberty” (11). Breyer defines the concept of active liberty as an ideological theme that “refers to a 
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sharing of a nation’s sovereign authority among its people” (15). He asserts that “active liberty 
cannot be understood in a vacuum, for it operates in the real world...and in the real world, 
institutions and methods of interpretation must be designed in a way such that the form of liberty 
is both sustainable over time and capable of translating the people’s will into sound 
policies” (16). He defends the notion of active liberty, stating that the people’s will is more 
important than what a judge may believe or know is a more just outcome, for “even if a judge 
knows ‘what the just result should be,’ that judge ‘is not to substitute even his juster will’ for that 
of ‘the people.’ In a constitutional democracy ‘a deep seated conviction on the part of the 
people...is entitled to respect.’” (17). 
     The theme of active liberty is one aspect of a larger interpretive tradition referred to as a 
belief in The Living Constitution, which focuses less on the actual words that make up the 
Constitution and more so on the “underlying purpose” of the text because this “tradition sees 
texts as driven by purposes” (17). He asserts that “certain constitutional language, for example, 
reflects ‘fundamental aspirations and...‘moods,’ embodied in ...which were designed not to be 
precise’” (18). This focus on purpose over text ties into Breyer’s argument that judges must 
consider the consequences of their decisions. Breyer argues that,“since law is connected to life, 
judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to consequences” (18).
Since the Constitution’s aims are what are at stake, the method of achieving these 
purposes may change over time, which may correspondingly change what the Constitution’s 
amendments actually mean for the outcome of law or cases. Breyer maintains that “a judge 
should read constitutional language ‘as the revelation of the great purposes which were intended 
to be achieved by the Constitution’ itself, a ‘framework for’ and a ‘continuing instrument of 
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government’” (18). He additionally asserts that the underlying purpose of a text is especially 
important because of the changing times, and that a judge should “recognize that the Constitution 
will apply to ‘new subject matter...with which the Framers were not familiar’” (18). 
Breyer believes that the Framers had active liberty in mind when structuring the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and desired that the purpose of active liberty be implemented 
through the themes of the text. He claims that it is “reasonable from a historical perspective to 
view the Constitution as centrally focused upon active liberty, upon the right of individuals to 
participate in democratic self government” (21). He points to the states’ brief experimentation 
with different forms of self-government before the Constitutional Convention, and how the Bill 
of Rights explicitly attempted to protect democracy through “protections against government 
interference with certain fundamental personal liberties” (32). 
Breyer interprets later amendments as extending “underlying constitutional goals that, in 
part, were already there” (34). This discussion of the transformation of the Constitution through 
certain later amendments may be a jab at Justice Scalia and other textualists who consistently 
hold that the Bill of Rights was never intended to be incorporated into the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, Breyer implies that such amendments 
“confirmed and perfected” the Constitution’s existing democratic purposes (34).
He asserts that this “constitutional history has been a quest for workable government,” as 
well as a “workable democratic government protective of individual personal liberty” (34). 
Therefore, he believes that the changes to the Constitution and its interpretation, which are 
inherent in The Living Constitution approach, are driven by the need for the government to 
respond to changing times and continue to be functional and democratic. He also implies by this 
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that changes in the interpretation and application of the Constitution are necessary to continue to 
protect American citizens’ rights. Breyer argues that there are “modern government-related 
problems that call for a democratically based response” and that “increased recognition of the 
Constitution’s democratic objective can help judges deal more effectively with interpretive 
issues” (37). 
     Breyer thereby concludes that the people should be the impetus behind the courts, and the 
whole of democratic government. He asserts that the Constitution “is a document that trusts 
people to solve...problems themselves...and it creates a framework for a government that will 
help them do so” (133). Therefore, to achieve the underlying goal to create a democracy that the 
Constitution attempts to realize, the people must be put in control, and it is the duty of 
government workers to promote a participatory democracy in every way possible. Breyer 
believes, and demonstrates this belief throughout his decision-making process, that a Living 
Constitution approach with a particular focus on active liberty, purpose, and consequences 
therein, would achieve this ideal democratic environment, while a textualist approach would 
undermine such a development. 
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Chapter VI:
 Scalia’s and Breyer’s Defense and Critique of One Another
Justice Scalia criticizes the Living Constitution approach to interpreting the Constitution 
championed by judges such as Justice Breyer. Scalia argues that the belief in a Living 
Constitution, or “body of law that...grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet the 
needs of a changing society” is incredibly dangerous for our democratic society because “it is the 
judges who determine those needs and ‘find’ that changing law”(Scalia 38). He argues that this 
form of constitutional interpretation “is the common law returned, but infinitely more powerful 
than what the old common law ever pretended to be, for now it trumps even the statutes of 
democratic legislatures” (38). He states that this Living Constitution and its follies are exhibited 
in the process by which the Supreme Court examines cases, since one “will rarely find the 
discussion addressed to the text of the Constitutional provision that is at issue, or to the question 
of what was the originally understood or even the originally intended meaning of that text” (39). 
He explains that, “the starting point of analysis will be Supreme Court cases, and the new issue 
will presumptively be decided according to the logic that those cases expressed, with no regard 
for how far that logic, thus extended, has distanced us from the original text and 
understanding” (39). He criticizes not only this process of analyzing previous case law without 
considering the original meaning of the Constitutional text, but also the mindset of justices who 
are consequence-oriented. 
Scalia laments that “worse still, however, it is known and understood that if that logic 
fails to produce what in the view of the current Supreme Court is the desirable result for the case 
at hand, then, like good common-law judges, the Court will distinguish its precedents, or narrow 
them, or if all else fails overrule them, in order that the Constitution might mean what it ought to 
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mean” (39). He jabs at The Living Constitution approach, using the catchprhase “if it is good, it 
is so” to describe how judges decide cases based on approval of the issue rather than evaluation 
of the Constitution (39). Mimicking the mentality of judges, he asks, “should there be--to take 
one of the less controversial examples--a constitutional right to die? if so, there is”(39). Rejecting 
this approach, he sarcastically asserts, “never mind the text that we are supposedly construing; 
we will smuggle these new rights in” (39).  He also criticizes The Living Constitution approach 
because he believes it makes amendments that should be static in meaning temporal. He 
communicates this mentality in the expression, “what the Constitution meant yesterday it does 
not necessarily mean today” because according to evolutionists, “its meaning changes to reflect 
‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’” (40). He 
asserts that “this is preeminently a common-law way of making law, and not the way of 
construing a democratically adopted text” (40). He concludes “the Constitution...even though a 
democratically adopted text, we formally treat like the common law...what, it is fair to ask, is the 
justification for doing so?” (40). He argues that it is inappropriate “to tinker with a Constitution, 
when their tinkering is virtually irreparable” (40). 
His textualist view of the Constitution is fundamentally irreconcilable with The Living 
Constitution approach. In his opinion, “it certainly cannot be said that a constitution naturally 
suggests changeability; to the contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change--to embed certain 
rights in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away” (40). He 
concludes that Americans should be resistant to this approach as a democracy because “a society 
that adopts a Bill of Rights is skeptical that “evolving standards of decency” always “mark 
progress,” and that societies always “mature,” as opposed to rot” (40). He argues that The Living 
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Constitution approach robs the legislature of decision-making and gives it to overly active 
Justices who are unelected by the people, despite the argument that The Living Constitution 
promotes active liberty through its focus on consequences and its value of the people’s current 
convictions. Scalia refutes this point, arguing that, “neither the text of such a document nor the 
intent of its framers (whichever you choose) can possibly lead to the conclusion that its only 
effect is to take the power of changing rights away from the legislature and give it to the 
courts” (41). 
He further dissects the support for The Living Constitution approach that judges cite in 
their defense, primarily refuting the argument that the evolutionist approach is pragmatic 
because, “[s]uch an evolutionary approach is necessary in order to provide the “flexibility” that a 
changing society requires; the Constitution would have snapped if it had not been permitted to 
bend and grow” (41). He states that this argument would only be valid and persuasive “if most of 
the ‘growing’ that the proponents of this approach have brought upon us in the past, and are 
determined to bring upon us in the future, were the elimination of restrictions upon democratic 
government” (41). He maintains that “just the opposite is true [because] [h]istorically, and 
particularly in the past thirty-five years, the ‘evolving’ Constitution has imposed a vast array of 
new constraints--new flexibilities--upon administrative, judicial, and legislative action” (41). He 
laments that the intention of the evolutionists is to institute more constraints on the American 
people by construing the Constitution’s text in one limited way, so that state and federal laws 
cannot reflect changes in public opinion. He argues that this approach guarantees “the creation of 
new restrictions upon democratic government” and “[l]ess flexibility in government, not 
more” (42). Pointing to assisted suicide and capital punishment legislation, he asserts that if 
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living constitutionalists had their way, states would have no ability to experiment and vary in 
their laws on these matters. Scalia believes that states should be able to change their laws “as the 
changing times and the changing sentiments of society may demand” (42).  He concludes that 
“[a]s things now stand, the state and federal governments may either apply capital punishment or 
abolish it, permit suicide or forbid it...but when capital punishment is held to violate the Eighth 
Amendment, and suicide is held to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, all flexibility 
with regard to those matters will be gone” (42).  
He concludes that despite how living constitutionalists state that they desire to champion 
positive social change, this is untrue because, “the reality of the matter is that, generally 
speaking, devotees of The Living Constitution do not seek to facilitate social change but to 
prevent it,” as these moral campaigns and opinions of living constitutionalists demonstrate (42). 
The defense that there are exceptions, he argues, only reinforces how not every “evolution will 
always be in the direction of greater personal liberty” and how “it is not true that every alteration 
of that balance in the direction of greater individual freedom is necessarily good” (42). The 
history of case decisions also refutes this notion that all decisions driven by a belief in The 
Living Constitution enlarge individual rights, and argues that “we may like the abridgment of 
property rights and like the elimination of the right to bear arms; but let us not pretend that these 
are not reductions of rights” (43).
     He attributes this haphazard development of evolutionist jurisprudence to the “lack of a 
guiding principle for evolution” of the Constitution (44). He states that it is also untrue that 
evolutionists always “follow the desires of the American people in determining how the 
Constitution should evolve [since] [t]hey follow nothing so precise; indeed, as a group they 
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follow nothing at all” because “there is no agreement, and no chance of agreement, upon what is 
to be the guiding principle of the evolution” (44)(45). The divisive stance of evolutionists as a 
group demonstrates the weakness of The Living Constitution philosophy in Scalia’s view. 
“Evolutionists divide into as many camps as there are individual views of the good, the true, and 
the beautiful. I think that is inevitably so, which means that evolutionism is simply not a 
practicable constitutional philosophy” (45). 
     Conceding that originalists do not always agree on a text’s meaning and how it should factor 
into an issue before the Court, Scalia contends that “the originalist at least knows what he is 
looking for: the original meaning of the text”(45). He argues that this search is frequently both 
fruitful and successful when construing legal passages because the text is “usually...easy to 
discern and simple to apply” (45). Scalia only references one exception to this usually smooth 
and predictable process of textualism, which is the occasional “disagreement as to how that 
original meaning applies to new and unforeseen phenomena” (45). He demonstrates how 
possible difficulties may arise for a textualist when facing new technological innovations, 
especially concerning the topic of interest here, the First Amendment. Scalia asks, how “does the 
First Amendment guarantee of “the freedom of speech” apply to new technologies that did not 
exist when the guarantee was created--to sound trucks, or to government-licensed over-the-air 
television?” (45). He answers that when facing new innovations, the Court must exercise careful, 
but often muddy, judgment because “in such new fields the Court must follow the trajectory of 
the First Amendment, so to speak, to determine what it requires --and assuredly that enterprise is 
not entirely cut-and-dried but requires the exercise of judgment” (45). He argues, however, that 
despite possible pitfalls, textualism must trump living constitutionalism, since “the originalist, if 
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he does not have all the answers, has many of them” while “for the evolutionist, on the other 
hand, every question is an open question, every day a new day” (46). Elaborating on the 
superiority of the textualist approach, he asserts that  “the difficulties and uncertainties of 
determining original meaning and applying it to modern circumstances are negligible compared 
with the difficulties and uncertainties of the philosophy which says that the Constitution 
changes; that the very act which it once prohibited it now permits, and which it once permitted it 
now forbids; and that the key to that change is unknown and unknowable” (45-46). 
He uses the example of the death penalty to demonstrate how little evolutionists reference 
the text of the Constitution; he asserts that he has served with three Supreme Court Justices who 
hold that the death penalty is unconstitutional, despite the fact that the death penalty is expressly 
discussed in the constitutional text (46). He observes that the constitution’s language on the 
subject are of “no matter” because “under The Living Constitution, the death penalty may have 
become unconstitutional” (46). It seems to Scalia that the death penalty can become 
unconstitutional depending on the sentiment of each living constitutionalist, who is not guided by 
any discernible principle. He concludes that “it probably does not matter what principle, among 
the innumerable possibilities, the evolutionist proposes to determine in what direction the living 
constitution will grow” because the evolving constitution will most likely evolve as the majority 
wishes under this constitutional approach (46). Scalia asserts that the Living Constitution 
mentality may wreak havoc on the judicial system as it becomes a tool of the majority to 
implement their passing sentiments permanently (46). 
Envisioning a kind of snowball effect in the future, Scalia predicts that, “if the people 
come to believe that the Constitution is not a text like other texts; that it means, not what it says 
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or what it was understood to mean, but what it should mean, in light of the “evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” then people will narrowly select judges 
not based on impartiality and qualifications, but impinged on their ideological sympathies and 
political opinions (46). This will lead to the will of the majority dominating the law through the 
legal system because citizens “will look for judges who agree with them as to what the evolving 
standards have evolved to; who agree with them as to what the Constitution ought to be” (47). In 
Scalia’s view, this disturbing political reality is already being realized in the judiciary (47). 
The campaign for the women’s right to vote brilliantly exemplifies his point that the 
Living Constitution has already taken a stronghold in the minds and political ambitions of the 
American people (47). Scalia explains that despite the Equal Protection Clause in the 
Constitution, the campaign for women’s suffrage was not orchestrated through the court system 
because “75 years ago, we believed firmly enough in a rock-solid, unchanging Constitution that 
we felt it necessary to adopt the Nineteenth Amendment to give women the vote” (47). Scalia 
contends that if the right to vote was a current issue, the courts would have been “the chosen 
instrumentality of change” and the Constitution would be formally unamended” (47). Scalia 
asserts that the mindset of the American people has been warped to believe that a Living 
Constitution exists, and that this document aimed to instill long-standing principles and rights for 
the people is actually “a ‘morphing’ document that means, from age to age, what it ought to 
mean” (47). The trend towards interrogating federal judge appointees about their ideological 
stances and their goals for the direction of this evolving constitution is a result of this ideological 
shift in the people, and the majority will be able to hijack the judiciary through this appointment 
process so that it always bends to its will. Scalia asserts that “if the courts are free to rewrite the 
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Constitution anew, they will, by god, write it the way the majority wants; the appointment and 
confirmation process will see to that” (47). Similar to Breyer, Scalia asserts that the 
constitutional philosophy that contradicts his own is undemocratic, or will lead to consequences 
which are detrimental for American democracy and lawmaking. Scalia argues that the 
phenomenon of giving the majority power over the judiciary through the appointment process “is 
the end of the Bill of Rights” because its “meaning will be committed to the very body it was 
meant to protect against: the majority” (47).
  Breyer’s critique of the textualist tradition is just as damning. Breyer contrasts his 
constitutional approach and focus on active liberty with textualism, which is championed most 
prominently and defended most avidly by Justice Scalia in the essay discussed above. Breyer 
condemns the textualist approach as inappropriate for responding to new factors and innovations 
that the law currently may not cover, and that the Constitution’s authors did not foresee and 
address. He proclaims that he is “against adopting an overly rigid method of interpreting the 
Constitution--placing weight upon eighteenth-century details to the point at which it becomes 
difficult for a twenty-first-century court to apply the document’s underlying values” (73). He 
states that nitpicking at the Constitution’s text in response to such new advances is unhelpful, 
while The Living Constitution approach can respond to contemporary developments.
Breyer asserts that a crucial aspect of democracy is legislating by the people’s will, and 
that The Living Constitution and active liberty approach “helps translate the popular will into 
sound policy,” while “an overly literal reading of a text can too often stand in the way” (101). 
Breyer first argues that to decide a case properly, many different elements must be considered by 
the judge in control, and that relying only on evaluation of the text is a far too narrow and 
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therefore illogical way to construe a text’s meaning and proper effect in current society. When 
federal judges similarly face a web of text, history, structure, and precedent, he argues that they 
can decide the case like he does, “with less discord, more faithfully to the entire enterprise, and 
with stronger justification for the power I wield in a government that is of, by, and for the people, 
by paying close attention to the Constitution’s democratic active liberty objective” (109). 
Breyer elaborates on the advantages of the Living Constitution that a textualist approach 
lacks in his view. He reiterates a common theme among living constitutionalists that an evolving 
Constitution is necessary to handle unforeseen innovations in current times, alleging that 
“increased emphasis on the Constitution’s democratic objective will help Americans remain true 
to the past while better resolving their contemporary problems of government through 
law” (111). He states that an inherently necessary aspect of dealing with contemporary issues is 
to examine the purposes beneath the Constitution’s text and animate the democratic values that 
Americans live by. Breyer describes how he “sees individual Constitutional provisions as 
embodying certain basic purposes, often expressed in highly general terms” and idealizes the 
Constitution as a document that furthers basic democratic aims as a whole, not just in its various 
parts (115). He argues that consequences are an important aspect of the judicial decision-making 
process because they indicate how well the Court is achieving the democratic goals inherent in 
the Constitution’s soul (115). Consistent with his aim to promote democracy through the courts, 
Breyer states that a “focus on purpose seeks to promote active liberty by insisting on 
interpretations...that are consistent with the people’s will” and a “focus on consequences, in turn, 
allows us to gauge whether and to what extent we have succeeded n facilitating workable 
outcomes which reflect that will” (115). 
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After demonstrating the logic of his philosophy, he fully confronts those who believe that 
focus on purposes and consequences is inappropriate when construing legal text, and 
constitutional text in particular. He summarizes his interpretation of their argument that once 
justices frequently use “real-world consequences” as their guide in the courts, they will act 
undemocratically because their decisions will be inescapably subjective when oriented towards 
the outcome of a case (11). Critics also feel that using text, tradition, and precedent will provide 
an important safeguard against the possibility of a judge confusing his own personal views with 
constitutional mandates. He also argues that textualists and literalists reject the Living 
Constitution approach because they believe it will have the consequence of making judges more 
subjective. Framed in these terms, Breyer says this is hypocritical because the non-
consequentialists in ideology are consequentialist in their defense of their legal theory. 
Breyer aims to refute this assertion that judges who refuse to be literalists will necessarily  
become subjective in their rulings. He elaborates that his consequentialist approach does not 
“consider simply whether the consequences of a proposed decision are good or bad, in a 
particular judges opinion, rather, to emphasize consequences is to emphasize consequences 
related to the particular textual provision at issue” (120). Breyer argues that since “the judge 
must examine the consequences through the lens of the relevant constitutional value or 
purpose...the relevant values limit interpretive possibilities” (120). He also maintains that if the 
values are democratic, the judge will interpret them to mean judicial restraint as well.  Breyer 
additionally contends that if a judge focuses on consequences, the realization that subjectivity in 
the Court’s decision- making will harm the legal system and cause negative consequences in 
society will also deter judges from acting subjectively (120). This focus on consequences 
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therefore does not encourage judges to act subjectively, because “a focus on consequences will 
itself constrain subjectivity” (120). 
Breyer also attacks the textualist and literalist view that relying on text will not breed 
subjectivity in the courts, especially when a text is difficult to interpret or apply to a situation. He 
contends that “subjectivity is a two-edged criticism, which the literalist himself cannot escape 
[because the] literalist’s tools--language and structure, history and tradition--often fail to provide 
objective guidance in those truly difficult cases” (124). Breyer argues that the canons Scalia 
discusses in his essay do not provide subjectivity, because picking which canon to follow is in 
itself a subjective decision made by the textualist or literalist judge. He claims that whether a 
judge interprets a canon narrowly or broadly can add to the risk of subjectivity of supposedly 
objective tools of interpretation (124). He concludes that these “uncertainties” that he points out 
demonstrate how “the textualist, originalist, and literalist approaches themselves possess 
inherently subjective elements” (127). The use of canons, or linguistic or historical 
interpretations, Breyer asserts, can also cause doubts among the people concerning the integrity 
of the judiciary because the decision-making process is less transparent and clear when it 
involves such tools (127). Since the people and their participation and views are what is most at 
stake in Breyer’s view, this is unacceptable because it reduces the democratic value of the 
Supreme Court and the integrity of the judiciary. 
     He also does “not believe that textualist or originalist methods of interpretation are more 
likely to produce clear, workable legal rules” in the real-world, and he asserts that they may 
create dire consequences for Americans (129). In Breyer’s own words, he concludes that, 
“textualist and originalist doctrines may themselves produce seriously harmful consequences--
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outweighing whatever risks of subjectivity or uncertainty are inherent in other 
approaches” (129). 
Jabbing textualists at their own game, Breyer cites how “the Constitution itself says that 
the ‘enumeration’ in the Constitution of some rights ‘shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
other retained by the people’” (117). Breyer believes that the Framers incorporated this statement 
into the text to “make clear that ‘rights, like the law itself, should never be fixed, frozen, that new 
dangers and needs will emerge, and that to respond to these dangers and needs, rights must be 
newly specified to protect the individual’s integrity and inherent dignity’” (117-118). This text, in 
combination with the fundamentally open nature of content, motivates Breyer to reject the notion 
that the Constitution only offers eternally fixed values. Breyer also seeks to demonstrate that the 
basic purposes that the Framers wrote into the Constitution are not always achieved when judges 
rely on a textualist or literalist approach, and that this fact is primarily demonstrated in the 
textualist disregard for the people’s will--the driving force behind the democracy the framers 
sought to create (131). He argues that “literalism has a tendency to undermine the Constitution’s 
efforts to create a framework for democratic government--a government that, while protecting 
basic individual liberties, permits citizens to govern themselves, and to govern themselves 
effectively” (131-132). Breyer asserts that by undermining “this basic objective, [textualism] is 
inconsistent with the most fundamental original intention of the Framers themselves” (132). 
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Chapter VII:
 Predicting and Comparing Breyer’s and Scalia’s Decisions in Schwarzenegger v 
Entertainment Merchants Association
In deciding Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants, Justice Scalia will most likely 
find that California’s law to censor “patently offensive video games” for minors is 
unconstitutional, and reject California’s assertion that the Court should use a new Ginsberg 
standard rather than the strict scrutiny standard when evaluating the California bill in dispute 
(Pet. Br. at 3). Scalia has demonstrated the ideas he presented in his essay through his decisions 
in past cases, which also involve applying amendments from the Bill of Rights to hotly debated 
issues. In each decision, Scalia places great importance on the constitutional text or “‘our 
society’s traditional understanding of the text’” (Rossum 32). Therefore, in determining the 
constitutionality of a law in dispute before the Court, Scalia relies on both constitutional text and 
tradition to guide his decision-making process.
Each departure from the original meaning of the Constitution’s text is considered 
dangerous in Scalia’s eyes because it degrades the integrity of the Constitution. To Scalia, the 
fact that Supreme Court cases rarely focus on the wording of the amendment at stake 
demonstrates how little respect the Court has for the Constitution as a document, and how the 
Supreme Court’s decision-making process increasingly reflects that of the common law courts, 
which attempt to decide a case based on the correct consequences rather than on the actual text 
of a body of law. He has demonstrated his loyalty to the text over consideration of what Breyer 
may define as negative societal consequences in Coy v Iowa (Rossum 30). In Coy, Scalia 
asserted that despite societal concerns that people may have for the underage victims of rape and 
molestation, laws that prevent the defendant from directly seeing a witness violate the 
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defendant’s right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him” in the Sixth Amendment 
(Rossum 30)(U.S. Const. amend VI). Scalia defends this point in his essay, stating that confront 
“means face-to-face,” even if society disapproves of the circumstances (Scalia 43-44). 
Tradition is also a crucial factor for Scalia. According to him, the Constitution is meant to 
be a long-lasting text, whose meaning is static over time (40). Statutory texts can be edited and 
revamped with the passing sentiments of the people by the Legislature, he believes, but the 
Constitution is meant to be a bedrock that establishes fundamental rights that should not have 
one meaning today and another meaning tomorrow (40). When Justice Souter’s majority opinion 
in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union held that a courthouse display of the Ten 
Commandments violated the Establishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment because the 
government could not publicly espouse religion, Scalia used references to America’s historical 
understanding of the Establishment Clause in his dissent (Rossum et al. 312). He asserted that 
the authors of the Constitution and the society that adopted it did not originally believe the 
amendment’s words to mean that “[r]eligion is to be strictly excluded from the public 
forum” (Rossum et al. 314)(McCreary). Scalia demonstrates this assertion by pointing out that 
the presidential oath ends with “so help me God,” the currency is inscribed with “In God We 
Trust,” the “First Congress instituted the practice of beginning its legislative sessions with a 
prayer,” and “[t]he day after the First Amendment was proposed, the same Congress that had 
proposed it requested the President to proclaim ‘a day of thanksgiving and prayer, to be 
observed, by acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the many and signal favours of the Almighty 
God,’” (Rossum et al. 314)(McCreary).  Expanding and warping the constitutional amendment to 
restrict certain religious expression was wrong in Scalia’s view because that was not a part of the 
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Constitution’s original meaning, as he demonstrated through the actions of the government at the 
time. The way that an amendment is historically perceived, therefore, is also crucial to Scalia. 
In deciding the case Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association, Scalia’s 
approach to the Constitution will lead him to be unsympathetic towards government attempts to 
restrict expression that is otherwise protected under the First Amendment by construing the text, 
society’s traditional understanding of the text, and the Supreme Court’s case history differently 
than is historically supportable. The distinction between sex and violence in the case history will 
probably be crucial to Scalia’s interpretation of the California bill at issue in Schwarzenegger v 
Entertainment Merchants Association. His focus on tradition leads him to approach this 
constitutional question of whether the State can restrict minors’ access to graphically violent 
expression the same way it can restrict minors’ access to sexually explicit material with a special 
focus on the place of sex and violence in American society and the history of the First 
Amendment. Scalia would reject California’s attempt to create a new Ginsberg standard because 
censorship of sex to minors is not equivalent to censorship of violence to minors when 
evaluating American traditions, especially literary traditions. 
Scalia would most likely agree with Respondents’ assertions in their brief that sex has not 
historically not been celebrated in American society the way that violence has, and would be 
swayed by such examples as the Grimm’s fairy tales.  Scalia asked during the oral argument of 
the case if “there are established norms of violence” because in his view, “some of the Grimm’s 
Fairy Tales are pretty grim” (U.S. Supreme Court Media). Scalia would concur, based on his 
approach’s goal to sift out the historically prevailing view of a constitutional issue, that 
depictions of violence in literary works such as the Grimm’s fairy tales, Harry Potter, Lord of the 
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Flies, Lord of the Rings trilogy, and other graphically violent works directly aimed for 
consumption by minors demonstrate the traditional acceptance of violence in American society, 
as well as the original meaning of the text of the First Amendment (Resp. Br. at 11). 
The text at stake is crucial in Scalia’s application of his constitutional approach to the 
case of Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association. He asks during oral argument 
what the Founders who penned the First Amendment would have thought of California’s attempt 
to create a category of violence that could be considered unprotected speech under the First 
Amendment (U.S. Supreme Court Media). The original meaning of the text was the object of this 
inquiry, because he believes that this original meaning should guide the Court’s decision. Scalia 
would mostly view the historical examples cited in the Respondent’s brief as persuasive evidence 
that violence has never been considered unprotected under the First Amendment, and that the 
authors of the First Amendment did not intend to restrict children’s exposure to violence (Resp. 
Br.). Scalia has “insisted that since the nation's founding, depictions of sex could be banned, but 
not depictions of violence and torture (Savage). The noscitur a sociis canon, which means “as 
understood by companions,” could be applied to the First Amendment’s words “freedom of 
speech” to decide the issue with the textualist approach.
Scalia will most likely use the famous literary examples listed above in his opinion of the 
case similar to the manner in which he used historical examples to demonstrate the original 
understanding of the Establishment Clause in McCreary, and may rely on canons such as 
noscitur a sociis. Scalia will probably research the laws of the era in which the Constitution was 
written, and decipher whether they censored violence as to adults and minors during the nation’s 
founding. As to the English tradition that American laws inherited after the founding, Scalia will 
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most likely point out that laws restricting speech were aimed at obscenity as defined in sexual 
terms, not by violent expression (Savage). 
Scalia has asserted that when there are new technological innovations that were not 
covered in the original meaning of the First Amendment, “the Court must follow the trajectory of 
the First Amendment, so to speak, to determine what it requires” (Scalia 45). Scalia will 
therefore be concerned with the Court’s traditional approach towards deciding cases that attempt 
to restrict violence when evaluating Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association. As 
thoroughly described in the Entertainment Merchants Association’s brief, the Supreme Court has 
always been adamant in striking down laws that restrict violence, while being more lenient 
towards laws that restrict expression of the sexually obscene. Examples include the pulp fiction 
novel and Internet regulations (Resp. Br. at 15)(Rossum 206).
This case history demonstrates that the Supreme Court has historically treated sex and 
violence differently under the First Amendment. Traditionally, the Court has refused to restrict 
violent expression both when new mediums depicting graphic violence have become more 
popular in society, and when states have attempted to minimize the constitutional protection of 
violence (Resp. Br. at 15). During the oral argument with the Petitioner’s lawyer Mr. Morazzini, 
Scalia asserted that California’s argument that video game violence is particularly obscene 
because of the medium it is portrayed in could be applied to any new medium, such as comic 
books and movies, which have not been subject to censorship regulations similar to those 
proposed by California.
The use of strict scrutiny in deciding whether a state has a legitimate interest in restricting 
speech based on content, and whether the law is narrowly tailored and least restrictive in 
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achieving this compelling state goal, has also been historically used by the Court. This test 
represents a crucial aspect of the trajectory of the First Amendment with which Scalia is 
concerned.  Scalia would reject the creation of a whole new test and a whole new prohibition on 
speech, because this is not in accordance with traditional Supreme Court jurisprudence. In the 
oral argument of the case, he interrogates California’s lawyer Mr. Morazzini about where the 
government will draw the line when restricting speech (U.S. Supreme Court Media). Scalia 
would believe that if the government is allowed to restrict access to violent video games, where 
will this restriction end? He would not find the Miller Test to be a satisfying limit on the 
government’s ability to censor violence, because traditionally the Miller Test was only directed 
towards evaluating obscenity concerning depictions of sex. Scalia additionally hinted in his 
questions during the oral argument that the Court’s traditional avoidance of allowing a chilling 
effect on speech may also guide his decision to side with the Respondents; he asks Mr. 
Morazzini how video game industries will know how to construct video games in compliance 
with the new Act (U.S. Supreme Court Media). 
Justice Scalia’s reliance on text and tradition to decide this case highlights what he values 
in his approach to the Constitution. Scalia focuses on the text primarily because he believes that 
the Court should preserve the original meaning of the Constitution’s words, which in turn results 
in the preservation of its democratic principles. This act of interpreting the text, Scalia believes, 
keeps the majority from legislating its beliefs through the appointment of judges who 
ideologically agree with them, and make decisions based on popular sentiment rather than on 
neutral analysis of the constitutional text at stake. Scalia holds that living constitutionalists who 
change the meaning of the Constitution are acting inappropriately by allowing the majority to 
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dictate the outcome of constitutional interpretations. What people like, or what is popular, Scalia 
asserts, should not be the guiding principle for the court’s decision-making process, as he 
demonstrated in decisions such as Coy (Scalia 43)(44). In his essay, he discusses how people 
“may like” restrictions the Court upholds, such as restrictions on gun laws despite the Second 
Amendment, but nevertheless, these are still new restrictions on freedom (43). He argues that the 
Bill of Rights was meant to protect the people from majority rule, and that changing the 
Constitution based on “the evolving standards of decency” (which the majority naturally 
determines) makes the Bill of Rights accomplish “nothing at all” (40)(47). 
Breyer’s constitutional approach lies at the opposite end of the spectrum when compared 
to Scalia’s textualism, since Scalia would most likely assert that Breyer is a willing participant in 
the degradation of the Constitution’s textual integrity. In response to Breyer’s likely decision to 
side with the Petitioners, Scalia would assert that Breyer’s evolutionist ideology impedes the Bill 
of Right’s purpose to prevent America’s democratic government from being subject to the 
“tyranny of the majority” (Federalist 10). Additionally, Scalia would believe that Breyer’s 
sympathy for the convictions of the people by upholding California’s law in Schwarzenegger v 
Entertainment Merchants Association crystalizes his argument that living constitutionalists are 
necessarily guided by the will of the majority when deciding constitutional questions (Scalia 47). 
Rather than focusing on text and tradition, Breyer’s decision-making relies on purpose 
and the people. Breyer’s belief that there are underlying purposes communicated through the text 
of the Constitution, and that the most important purpose of the Constitution as a whole is to 
promote the people’s ability to engage in democracy, demonstrates how his vision of The Living 
Constitution is closely tied to the convictions held by the majority. 
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In Active Liberty, Breyer argues that at times, the government should be able to regulate 
speech (Breyer 41). He argues that if the First Amendment is given too much sway, this “would 
prevent a democratically elected government from creating necessary regulation [and] if applied 
without distinction to all governmental efforts to control speech,” would “unreasonably limit the 
public’s substantive economic (or social) regulatory choices” (41). Breyer also raises a concern 
for the people’s right to participate in democracy and collectively decide which speech they want 
to regulate. He argues that, “strong pro-speech presumptions risk imposing what is, from the 
perspective of active liberty, too severe a restriction upon the legislature--a restriction that would 
dramatically limit the size of the legislative arena that the Constitution opens for public 
deliberation and action” (42). He concludes that in First Amendment cases, “the presence of this 
second risk warns against use of special, strong pro-speech judicial presumptions or special 
regulation-skeptical judicial views” (42). Believing that the Court must not “depriv[e] the people 
of the democratically necessary room to make decisions, including the leeway to make 
regulatory mistakes,” Breyer is much more likely to be sympathetic to the Petitioners in 
Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association (41). 
In Breyer’s view, the objective of allowing the people to have a voice in their 
government’s regulation of speech and the objective of maintaining a free exchange of 
expression in the marketplace of ideas need to be balanced. Breyer believes that categorizing and 
making distinctions between speech as to whether to apply strict or relaxed scrutiny is crucial to 
balancing these needs in the Court’s decision-making process. One of the main issues in 
Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants is what standard of review should be employed by 
the Court when deciding whether the law is constitutional in its regulation of speech through 
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video game laws about ratings. Breyer asserts that “references to the Constitution’s more general 
objectives helps” when analyzing First Amendment cases (42). He argues that protecting political 
speech is particularly important because of the Constitution’s democratic aims, but “whenever 
ordinary commercial or economic regulation is at issue, this special risk [to the Constitution’s 
purpose to protect liberty] normally is absent” (42). 
Breyer thereby claims that deference to the Legislature and to the people in First 
Amendment cases is crucial to maintaining the democratic objective of the Constitution and 
promoting active liberty. This point is complex because promoting liberty can at times mean 
upholding restrictions on certain liberties, such as speech in commercial contexts, as long as the 
people’s will is behind these restrictions. This assertion also relates to Breyer’s belief that the 
Supreme Court should allow the people to make regulatory mistakes, and should thereby give 
deference to legislatures that enact the people’s will, even if this means enacting some 
restrictions on certain constitutional liberties. 
This aspect of Breyer’s constitutional approach is particularly key in Schwarzenegger v 
Entertainment Merchants because Breyer aims to allow the people to enact regulations on speech 
since, ironically, the people’s ability to restrict certain freedoms inherently boosts their overall 
freedom. He concludes that “the upshot is that reference to constitutional purposes in general and 
active liberty in particular helps to justify the category of review that the Court applies to a given 
type of law” and the Court should “define and apply the categories case by case” (42-43). This 
argument seems to imply that the type of review used should be chosen based on these 
considerations of the people’s will and the desire to promote democracy, or active liberty, rather 
than on the actual facts of the case. Under this logic, one could presumably believe that a stricter 
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method of review should be employed less so in cases when restrictions on speech are driven by 
the people’s will. 
These tenets of Breyer’s approach to the Constitution and to the First Amendment will 
guide his decision in the case of Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association. Breyer 
is much less resistant to creating new forms of constitutional review on the Supreme Court than 
Scalia. Since he is less prone to steadfastly follow tradition, text, and precedent, he may be more 
willing to allow the Ginsberg standard to be applied to the case rather than strict scrutiny. If strict 
scrutiny impedes the will of the people, then a new approach or test may be crucial in order for 
the Court to achieve the Constitution’s democratic goals of empowering the people through their 
Legislature. A whole new category of unprotected speech may be considered a necessary risk, 
especially since the Miller Standard can serve as a safeguard that narrows the category of speech 
that the Ginsberg standard would be applicable to (U.S. Supreme Court Media). In his attempt to 
empower the people, Breyer would be willing to add this standard to the rating already in place, 
if societal standards deem it necessary. The fact that there is a case history of state legislatures 
attempting to enact such laws against video game violence, as demonstrated in an Illinois law 
which used language almost identical to California’s, the rising tide of the people’s negative 
opinion of minors playing graphically violent video games may need to be given sway in 
accordance with Breyer’s aims goals for active liberty and his principles of promoting a Living 
Constitution (Pet. Br. at 12). 
In the oral argument of the case, Breyer also demonstrated his willingness to neglect 
precedent and details of the text when he brought up the notion of “common sense” (Savage)
(U.S. Supreme Court Media). He wonders why it is logical that a state can regulate what sexually  
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obscene materials minors are exposed to, but cannot regulate what offensively violent materials 
minors purchase (Savage). Breyer may therefore discuss how common sense should trump 
precedent and the constitutional text when evaluating the case in his decision. He will also most 
likely assert that the distinction between sex and violence in the Court’s traditional interpretation 
of the First Amendment is arbitrary when applied to minors once viewed through the lens of 
common sense and active liberty. 
Also, Breyer asserts in his defense of The Living Constitution in Active Liberty that new 
mediums may require new constitutional standards that preserve the Constitution’s original intent 
to promote the people’s power. Although violence may have been considered a protected 
category of speech in the past in literature, video games are a new technological innovation that 
allow minors to actively participate in inflicting violence and torture on victims. Despite the fact 
that Entertainment Merchants argue that all expression is interactive, like composing music or 
using one’s imagination while reading, Breyer would most likely consider this a weak argument 
in light of the possibility that Californian society views this medium as particularly indecent. 
Breyer’s view of violence in video games will probably be deferential to the people’s will in his 
opinion of Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants Association, since he believes that “a 
deep seated conviction on the part of the people...is entitled to respect” (Breyer 17).
 If the standards of American society deem this new medium to be particularly dangerous 
in nature for minors, then this standard of harm should be given weight by the Court. This 
promotion of active liberty and democracy through his interpretation of the Constitution is also 
paramount in how this case touches upon federalism. Breyer believes that “[b]y guaranteeing 
state and local government broad decision-making authority, federalist principles secure 
 Moran 62
decisions that rest on knowledge of local circumstances, help to develop a sense of shared 
purposes and commitments among local citizens, and ultimately facilitate ‘novel social and 
economic experiments’” (57). This evaluation of the Act demonstrates Justice Breyer’s 
willingness to be guided by the people’s values in his approach to interpreting the Constitution.
Additionally, according to Justice Breyer, the ultimate purpose of the Bill of Rights 
boosts the legitimacy of his constitutional approach’s focus on the people because the 
Constitution aims to create a flourishing democracy that represents the people’s values in its 
legislation. In a highly general manner, the Constitution’s amendments and text, viewed together, 
demonstrate that the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to create a system in which people could 
actively contribute to their political destiny. If the purpose of the Constitution was to promote 
active liberty and democracy by giving rights and powers to the American people, then allowing 
people to pass legislation about constitutional issues is a necessity in achieving the Constitution’s 
democratic aim. Breyer will probably believe that California’s legislature should be given 
deference in this case because the type of speech at issue is not contributing to the Constitution’s 
democratic purpose as much as allowing the people to legislate their values and thus achieve the 
democratic aim of the Constitution of promoting active liberty. If the speech was political in 
nature, this balance may have been tipped in protecting the speech at stake because it would aid 
democratic goals, rather than in protecting the people’s active input in the legislature. At the very  
base of Breyer’s constitutional approach, and the way it influences his decision-making when 
evaluating First Amendment cases such as Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants 
Association, Breyer is concerned with how much a governmental act promotes active liberty and 
democracy. Balancing the different ways to achieve these democratic aims that he perceives 
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throughout the text of the Constitution is at times crucial to promoting a workable democracy 
from Breyer’s perspective. 
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Conclusion: 
Comparison of these Constitutional Approaches as Applied to Schwarzenegger v 
Entertainment Merchants
These theoretical decisions by Scalia and Breyer in Schwarzenegger v Entertainment 
Merchants Association demonstrate how their disparate constitutional approaches are manifested 
in their decision-making process as Justices of the Supreme Court, and serve as an illuminating 
springboard to highlight the similarities in each Justice’s stance towards upholding the 
Constitution and preserving American democracy. Both Scalia and Breyer outlined a discussion 
and defense of their constitutional approach in published works outside of Supreme Court 
decisions, as discussed in previous passages of this thesis. Their justifications for their 
approaches, and their criticisms and analyses of the other’s views, demonstrate that each 
constitutional theory and aim of each Justice is fundamentally similar, despite their condemning 
critiques of one another. The methods to achieve this same aim are strikingly different, however, 
which is demonstrated by the conflicting outcomes predicted for each Justice in this case. 
Both Breyer and Scalia aim to preserve the integrity of the Constitution and achieve a 
workable contemporary democracy in America through their decisions as Supreme Court 
Justices. Breyer attacks Scalia’s textualist approach as impeding the democratic aims of the 
Constitution, because an approach that places too much emphasis on the text can prevent the 
people from participating in national conversations about laws and from translating their values 
into “sound policies” (Breyer 16). Scalia asserts that belief in The Living Constitution and 
deference to the will of the people achieves the opposite effect of the shared aim to promote 
democracy, because a judge may engage in judicial activism not approved of by the American 
people through a belief in a Living Constitution, and the convictions of the people may create a 
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system of majority rule rather than a democracy (Scalia 47). Scalia fervently believes that 
“reliance on text and tradition is a means of constraining judicial discretion...[because] faithful 
adherence to the text of a constitutional...provision [or] to the traditional understanding of those 
who originally adopted it reduces the danger that judges will substitute their beliefs for 
society’s,” and that “the provisions of the Bill of Rights were designed to restrain transient 
majorities from impairing long-recognized personal liberties” (Rossum 27-28). Therefore, both 
Justices believe that the other’s approach will weaken rather than promote the democratic values 
that underlie the Bill of Rights, but fundamentally share the same aim to promote democracy in 
American government. 
Additionally, both Justices believe that their constitutional approach is faithful to the aims 
of the Constitution and its Framers, and will allow the Constitution to endure into the future. 
Scalia believes that remaining true to the original meaning of the text guarantees that the 
Constitution will not become meaningless when subjected to the sentiments of the Court and the 
people over time (Scalia 47). Breyer argues that the Constitution’s aim to promote an active 
democracy and empower the people sometimes requires interpreting its amendments differently 
over time, so that new developments in American society can be incorporated into America’s 
achievement of a workable system of self-governance. Breyer believes that allowing the 
Constitution’s meaning to change so that it can adapt to new developments in society will ensure 
that the Constitution will not become moot in future decisions, and that this evolution is crucial 
to continuing the Constitution’s purpose to promote democracy. Both approaches also subject the 
case at hand to society’s views of the text or issue. However, Scalia focuses on the “traditional 
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beliefs of society” and thus its historical view on the subject at hand, while Breyer focuses on the 
current society’s view (Rossum 28).
The important issue of using the Constitution to deal with new innovations and 
technological developments is exhibited in Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants 
Association through both interpretive approaches. Scalia argues that he is aware that there are 
many issues and developments not foreseen by the Founders, but that the original meaning of the 
text and of the Court’s traditional decision-making process towards a particular subject can still 
provide guidance when evaluating a case. Even though video games were never conceived of by 
the Founders (and are therefore not specifically considered in the original meaning of the text), 
Scalia asserts in the oral argument that the presence of violence in speech was foreseen by the 
Founders (U.S. Supreme Court Media). To construe the First Amendment differently than its 
original meaning proscribes would degrade the legitimacy of the Constitution as a document that 
is meant to instill longstanding values in America’s legal system.  To create a whole new 
category of unprotected speech because of evolving societal standards would weaken the 
legitimacy of the First Amendment, because its meaning will have changed drastically and the 
text will have been ignored in creating this new exception.
Breyer likewise believes his response to new innovations is faithful to the Constitution. 
He deciphers the purpose of the Constitution as promoting a democratic system that respects and 
empowers the American people, and allows them to make decisions about the regulations that 
their society is subject to and the manner in which they are governed. This self-governance 
includes regulations of speech and expression, and new mediums and developments may require 
new interpretations of the text and the Court’s jurisprudence. If the people decide that certain 
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forms of violence have no redeeming societal qualities and are therefore inappropriate to show to 
minors, this strongly held conviction should be influential in the Court’s ruling, according to The 
Living Constitution tradition. To evaluate the text of the First Amendment too closely and value 
it over the people’s democratic methods of engaging in self-governance is to give less credence 
to the Constitution’s aim to create a democracy, and fail to be faithful to the Constitution as a 
result. 
This case thereby vividly illustrates important dynamics in America’s court system. 
Although the Supreme Court aims to achieve the purposes of the Constitution and to promote 
crucial tenets of democracy, the methods to realize these goals in the context of Supreme Court 
decision-making are strikingly contradictory. Breyer’s approach prizes purpose over text, and 
Scalia text over the will of the majority. These fundamentally different stances towards the text 
of the Constitution and such important amendments as the First Amendment highlight the 
problem of how the Court does not currently have an overarching philosophy that dictates how it 
should do its work. This however, may make the Court more capable of maintaining and 
promoting a democracy. There are followers of both constitutional approaches in America, and to 
have Justices represent both on the Court is crucial to balancing the underlying democratic aims 
of the Constitution while not straying too far away from the Constitution’s specific text. 
When there is less dispute among Supreme Court Justices, perhaps if Scalia’s prediction 
that Living Constitutionalists will soon dominate the Court comes true, then the judiciary may be 
less able to respect and implement the widely held views of the Constitution when deciding 
hotly-debated issues such as those presented by Schwarzenegger v Entertainment Merchants 
Association. Similar to much of democratic government, the ultimate goals are agreed upon, but 
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the splintering factions about how to achieve these goals are not. This insight into the nature of 
the widely varying approaches to the Constitution is important because it demonstrates how the 
Court is one more venue for democratic debate. As the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court should continually challenge and question its mode of interpretation in order 
to effectively juggle the different purposes of the Constitution and the different sentiments of 
American citizens. As society develops and the Supreme Court’s body of law grows, the balance 
between preserving tradition and promoting change will most likely continue to be at the heart of 
the debate between Supreme Court Justices in the future. 
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